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SPECIAL EDUCATION DUE PROCESS HEARING
REQUESTS UNDER IDEA:
A HEARING SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE REQUIRED
Timothy E. Gilsbach*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”),1 the parents of a student who qualifies for the IDEA’s
protections may file a request for an impartial due process
hearing when they disagree “with respect to any matter related
to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of
the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public
education.”2 Such hearings, even when the school entity wins
the entire case, can be costly both for the educational entity, in
terms of its own legal fees and time spent by staff in a hearing
room rather than in a classroom educating children, and the
state system tasked with hearing these case if a full blown
hearing is unnecessarily required.3 Not surprisingly, the filing
of a special education due process hearing request or complaint
under the IDEA often results in a hearing. In fact, the IDEA
specifically provides that the parties “shall have an opportunity
for an impartial due process hearing.”4 Likewise, some states
have similar provisions in their administrative code that
appear to require a hearing on the merits rather than
*Associate with King, Spry, Herman, Freund & Faul, LLC in Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania. J.D., The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law
(2004), B.A., Messiah College (2000). Mr. Gilsbach focuses his practice on representing
school districts, charter schools and other educational entities in the litigation of
special education matters in administrative due process hearings and in federal court.
1
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2005).
2
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (2005); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(2006). In
addition, a school district or other educational entity may, under certain circumstances,
file a request for an impartial due process hearing. Id. It is important to note that
parents are typically the filing party in a special education due process hearing.
3
See Sasha Pudelski, Rethinking Special Education Due Process: AASA IDEA
Re-Authorization Proposals: Part 1 (Apr. 2013)(noting costs, both financial and
otherwise, incurred by school districts through due process hearings).
4
20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(1)(A) (2005) (emphasis added).
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permitting pre-hearing dispositive motions.5
However,
whether due to specific issues raised or a backlog of cases, a
trend has emerged among the hearing officers tasked with
deciding these cases, to dismiss some of these complaints
without a hearing. For the following reasons, this trend should
be permitted and expanded in the same way as pre-trial
dispositive motions have been in other areas of the law in order
to allow for an efficient and cost saving means of addressing
cases that do not require a full hearing.
At present, it appears that there are three basic categories
for these types of cases: (1) special education due process cases
in which it is permissible under the language of the IDEA itself
to dismiss a hearing request without a hearing; (2) cases in
which hearing officers have, with the approval of the federal
courts, dismissed special education due process complaints
despite a lack of clear language in the IDEA authorizing such
action; and (3) cases in which the dismissal of the complaint
without a hearing is deemed impermissible. It should be noted
that the last species of case are cases decided wholly on factspecific scenarios and do not, therefore, establish that a
hearing is always required under the IDEA.
II.

DISMISSAL WITHOUT A HEARING IS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED
FOR UNDER IDEA IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES

Although the IDEA is unclear as to whether a hearing must
be held in these types of cases, there are several specific
provisions in the IDEA that permit a hearing officer to dismiss
a case without a hearing. For example, the IDEA explicitly
allows for the dismissal of a complaint due to (1) the failure of
the parents to participate in the mandatory resolution session,
or (2) an insufficient complaint based upon the standards
articulated in the IDEA.

5
See, e.g., 22 PA. CODE §14.162(f) (2001). It should be noted that there
continues to be some dispute as to whether or not state administrative codes apply in
these types of hearings, which are typically held by state agencies applying both
federal and state law. However, to the extent that they are applicable, state
regulations in some jurisdictions raise additional questions as to whether or not a
hearing must be held.
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Failure to Participate in a Resolution Session as Basis for
Dismissal

The hearing officer is empowered to dismiss the complaint
when the child’s parents file a due process hearing request but
fail or otherwise refuse to participate in a mandatory resolution
session with the local school entity and the school does not
waive the resolution process.6 It is unclear if such a dismissal
is with or without prejudice, although dismissals of this type
are typically done without prejudice.7 While this mechanism
may serve to address passive parents, the procedural hoops
that the school district or Local Educational Agency (“LEA”)8
must jump through to have the motion granted makes this
option of limited practical use, as the parents may simply file
again without forfeiting any claims.9
B.

Insufficient Complaint as Basis for Dismissal

The other provision of the IDEA that permits the dismissal
of claims on the basis of an insufficient complaint is of far more
value to school districts because it may lead to an outright
dismissal of the complaint with prejudice or lead to a more
specific pleading by the parents, providing the LEA with more
information about the dispute. The provision allows for the
hearing officer to dismiss the complaint, order the filing of an
amended complaint that provides more details of the
allegations against the school district or deny the sufficiency
challenge.10 The IDEA provides that a school district may
challenge the sufficiency of the complaint within fifteen days of
6
34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(4) (2006); Marinette Sch. Dist., 107 LRP 8221 (Wis.
SEA, Feb. 14, 2007); Kansas City Mo. 33 Sch. Dist., 109 LRP 61302 (Mo. SEA, Aug, 4,
2008); Summer City Bd. of Educ., 109 LRP 66470 (N.J. SEA, Apr. 9, 2008); In re:
Student with a Disability, 111 LRP 9103 (W.Va. SEA, Dec. 14, 2010). It is important to
note that prior to seeking dismissal the school district must make reasonable efforts to
get the parents to participate in the resolution session and document those efforts; see
also 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(4) (2006).
7
See Marinette Sch. Dist., 107 LRP 8221; Kansas City Mo. 33 Sch. Dist., 109
LRP 61302; Summer City Bd. of Educ., 109 LRP 66470; In re: Student with a
Disability, 111 LRP 9103; Perry A. Zirkel, Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: Legal
Issues and Answers (2010).
8
The IDEA refers to the concept of a Local Educational Agency (“LEA”), which
may be a school district, charter school or other educational entity. See 20 U.S.C. §
1401(19)(2005). Throughout this article the term school district will be used, but would
include all LEA’s.
9
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(4) (2006).
10
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(d)(2006).
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receipt of the complaint.11 While most complaints are deemed
sufficient in terms of most of the IDEA’s requirements,12 there
is much debate about what is required to be sufficient in
identifying the nature of the problem, “including facts related
to the problem.”13
Decisions on this issue have taken differing views as to how
this requirement is met. One court has opined that the IDEA’s
requirements “impose ‘minimal pleading standards’ on the
parties.”14 However, another court has taken the position that
the IDEA requires more than a “bare notice pleading.”15 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “the purpose of
the statute to foster cooperation between the parents and
educational agency is served by a development of the factual
basis for the dispute prior to the initiation of adversarial
proceedings.”16 The court ultimately found that merely alleging
the nature of the problem, without including the facts to
Moreover, the
support the claim, was not sufficient.17
legislative intent of the sufficiency requirements is “to ensure
that the other party, which is generally the school district, will
have an awareness and understanding of the issues forming
the basis of the complaint.”18
It is clear under the IDEA that a school district may insist
that factual allegations be more specific and, if not specific, the

20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2) (2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(d) (2006).
The IDEA and its applicable regulations require that the Due Process
Complaint include the name of the child, address of residence, a description of the
nature of the problem, and a proposed resolution. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii) (2005).
13
34 C.F.R. § 300.508(b)(5) (2006); see also Pottstown Sch. Dist. 110 LRP 68536
(Pa. SEA, Oct. 3, 2010); Cent. York Sch. Dist., 111 LRP 16560 (Pa. SEA, Sept. 25 2010);
Norwalk Bd. of Educ. 110 LRP 57855 (Conn. SEA, Sept. 1, 2010); Farmington Bd. of
Educ., 110 LRP 32033 (Conn. SEA, May 5, 2010); Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 110 LRP
32037 (Conn. SEA, Apr. 28, 2010); Wallingford-Swarthmore Sch. Dist., 110 LRP 40319
(Pa. SEA, Feb. 20, 2010); Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 109 LRP 68049 (Conn. SEA, Sept. 15,
2009); Hartford Bd. of Educ., 109 LRP 61407 (Conn. SEA, Aug. 24, 2009); Peoria Sch.
Dist. 150, 109 LRP 57501 (Ill. SEA, Mar. 24, 2009); Greenwich Bd. of Educ., 111 LRP
17391 (Conn. SEA, Nov. 7, 2009) (explaining insufficient factual pleading of the nature
of the problem and the facts to support the same as the basis for most sufficiency
challenges).
14
Alexandra R. v. Brookline Sch. Dist., No. 06-cv-0215-JL, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83481, at *16 (D.N.H. Sept. 10, 2009) (citing Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 54
(2005)).
15
M.S.G. v. Lenape Regional High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 306 Fed. Appx. 772,
774 (3d Cir. 2009).
16
Id. at 722 (citing Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53).
17
Id. at 744.
18
S. Rep. No. 108–85, at 28 (2003).
11
12
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school may seek to have the complaint dismissed or a court
order instructing the parents to file a more specific complaint.
Both methods are beneficial to the school district and should be
used more regularly as a method of having a case dismissed or
obtaining more facts about the filing parties’ allegations. Such
requests often garner some response from the filing party,
which are often beneficial to the responding party, including
more factual averments as to the nature of the problem and the
supporting facts. Hearing officers will typically allow a filing
party to amend its complaint if the original complaint is found
to be insufficient, but only within a set period of time.19
However, at least one federal court has held that a hearing
officer’s dismissal of the complaint on sufficiency grounds
cannot be appealed.20 Thus, the use of this mechanism can
often be fruitful and should be employed more widely as a
means to either have a complaint dismissed or to narrow the
issues for hearing in order to try and resolve the matter or to
expedite the hearing process.
Accordingly, the IDEA, by expressly providing for the
dismissal of some due process complaints without a hearing,
cannot be read as requiring a hearing in every case, and it is
submitted that these tools provided for under the IDEA should
be used more frequently by LEAs.
III. DISMISSAL HAS BEEN PERMITTED IN A VARIETY OF CASES
THAT DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE SPECIFIC STATUTORY
PROVISIONS, AN AREA THAT SHOULD BE EXPANDED
While many of the cases in which hearing officers have
dismissed complaints prior to a hearing appear to involve
unique factual situations that would lend themselves to this
type of pre-hearing dismissal, it is clear that many hearing
officers and federal courts believe such a procedure is
permissible under the IDEA. Unlike other areas of the law
where discovery is provided for, many cases under the IDEA,

19
See, e.g., Pottstown Sch. Dist. 110 LRP 68536 ; Cent. York Sch. Dist., 111
LRP 16560; Norwalk Bd. of Educ. 110 LRP 57855; Farmington Bd. of Educ., 110 LRP
32033; Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 110 LRP 32037; Wallingford-Swarthmore Sch. Dist., 110
LRP 40319; Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 109 LRP 68049; Hartford Bd. of Educ., 109 LRP
61407; Peoria Sch. Dist. 150, 109 LRP 57501; Greenwich Bd. of Educ., 111 LRP 17391.
20
Knight v. Wash. Sch. Dist., 110 LRP 27769 (E. D. Mo. 2010), affirmed, 56
IDELR 189 (8th Cir. 2010).
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for which there is no pre-hearing discovery, can only be
dismissed based upon undisputed facts included in the
pleadings at the administrative level, with the presumption
that even if the alleged facts are true, the claim fails as a
matter of law. Such motions often relate to issues such as the
jurisdiction of the hearing officer to hear certain types of
claims, the lack of standing on the part of one of the parties, or
a failure to plead sufficient facts, rather than the substantive
issue of whether a student was denied a free and appropriate
public education (“FAPE”) which normally must have a hearing
to create a factual record. However, as the examples below
illustrate, it appears there is a certain level of creativity in
these types of motions as the approach has not always been
limited to specific factual patterns.
A.

Issue Preclusion

One example of dismissals found to be proper are cases
involving claim or issue preclusion. These cases typically
involve a review of the two complaints, the one filed in the
current matter and the one filed in the prior matter, and are
perhaps the simplest to resolve given that they typically
involve a review of the prior case to determine if the issues
raised in the current case were or could have been raised in the
prior one.21 In the cases of IDEA Public Charter School v.
Belton, No. 05-467, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52042 (D.D.C Jul.
19, 2007), and Patricia P. v. Board of Education of Oak Park, 8
F. Supp. 2d 801 (N.D. Ill. 1998), the hearing officer found that
claim preclusion would permit the dismissal of previously
raised claims.22 A review of the claims raised in the two cases
revealed, however, that the claims in the two matters were not
the same and the claim raised in the second matter was not
barred by claim preclusion.23 In other cases, hearing officers
have found that the same claims were essentially being
reasserted in the second matter as the first and, therefore, the
21
See, e.g., IDEA Pub. Charter Sch. v. Belton, No. 05-467, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 52042 (D.D.C. Jul. 19, 2007); Patricia P. v. Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park, 8 F. Supp.
2d 801 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Indep. Sch. Dist. of Boise, No. 1, 111 LRP 23776 (Idaho SEA,
Feb. 1, 2011); In re: T.B., 111 LRP 6399 S (Pa. SEA, Nov. 11, 2010); In re: Student with
a Disability, 57 IDELR 179 (N.Y. SEA, July 28, 2011); Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2,
111 LRP 51787 (Id. SEA, (July 1, 2011)); In re: Student with a Disability, 111 LRP
9103.
22
Belton, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52042; Patricia P., 8 F. Supp 2d. at 801.
23
Id.
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claims could be dismissed without a hearing.24 Typically, the
hearing officer needs a copy of the complaint and/or decision in
the last case, if a different hearing officer handled the review.25
This type of motion can often be used to dismiss claims in
which a party repeatedly files for due process.
B.

Lack of Jurisdiction

Complaints have also been dismissed that have been found
to be outside the jurisdiction of a hearing officer. Some
examples include claims for the enforcement of settlement
agreements or claims that center on matters not related to
special education. In the area of settlement agreements,
jurisdictions are split as to whether or not hearing officers have
authority to resolve such claims.26 Ample authority suggests,
however, that complaints predicated on a breach of a
settlement agreement should be dismissed prior to the hearing
because the hearing officer lacks jurisdiction over the claim.27
Claims not related to special education are also frequently
dismissed, and include, inter alia, claims of discrimination due
to race, tort claims, and violations of other federal statutes.28

24
Independent Sch. Dist. of Boise, No. 1, 111 LRP 23776; In re: T.B., 111 LRP
6399; In re: Student with a Disability, 57 IDELR 179; In re: Student with a Disability,
111 LRP 9103.
25
Independent Sch. Dist. of Boise No. 1,111 LRP 23776; In re: Student with a
Disability, 57 IDELR 179; In re: Student with a Disability, 111 LRP 9103.
26
Upland Unified Sch. Dist., 111 LRP 13468 (Cal. SEA 2007120214, Feb.17,
2011) (noting a lack of clarity as to whether a special education hearing officer has
authority to resolve disputes regarding the enforcement of a settlement agreement);
Wallingford-Swarthmore Sch. Dist., 110 LRP 26499 (Pa. SEA Mar. 14, 2010)(same);
Monson Pub. Sch., 110 LRP 49101 (Mass. SEA, (Aug. 23, 2010))(noting differing views
on this issue).
27
L.M. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-4855, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1999
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2011); Petersen v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing Office, No. C 07-2400
SI, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58532 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2008); Linda P. v. Hawaii, No. 0500585 SOM-KSC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52096 (D. Haw. July 25, 2006); Monson Pub.
Sch., 110 LRP 49101; New Britain Bd. of Educ., 110 LRP 57871 (Conn. SEA, Jul. 26,
2010); In re: Student with a Disability, 111 LRP 16554 (Pa. SEA, Jun. 5, 2010).
28
See, e.g., Old Rochester Pub. Sch., 111 LRP 66082 (Mass. SEA, Oct. 7, 2011)
(finding that the hearing officer lacked authority to order district to take specific action
with respect to a teacher); Springfield Pub. Sch., 111 LRP 26774 (Mass. SEA, Apr. 12,
2011) (concluding that the hearing officer lacks authority to order that district provide
parent with counsel for Due Process Hearing); Boston Pub. Schs., 111 LRP 32124
(Mass. SEA, Apr. 4, 2011) (holding that the hearing officer does not have authority to
rule on systematic complaints about school district’s special education system); Irvine
Unified Sch. Dist., 111 LRP 6893 (Cal. SEA, Jan. 20, 2011) (finding that the hearing
officer lacked authority to rule on Section 504 and 1983 claims); Spring Lake Park Pub.
Schs., 110 LRP 55042 (Minn. SEA, Jul. 1, 2010) (holding that the hearing officer lacked
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This suggests a need for careful review of the complaint to
determine if all of the claims raised are special education
matters under the IDEA or not and seek dismissal of those
claims that are not.
C.

Improper Party

Additionally, complaints are often dismissed when one of
the parties named is done so incorrectly. This can occur in two
different situations: either, (1) the wrong school entity is
named in the complaint, or (2) the person claiming to be the
parent under the IDEA lacks standing to act as the parent.
The first area in which these claims have been successfully
litigated is where the LEA or school district objects to being
listed as a party on the basis that it is not the proper defendant
in the case. Examples of such cases include instances where a
school entity is a contractor for another school and, therefore,
should not be a party to the due process hearing.29 Another
example includes students who are in private school by
parental choice and thus are not entitled to special education
services from the local school district.30 Other cases involve
claims that the IDEA considers improper when filed against
certain agencies, including mental health agencies.31 Motions to
dismiss have also been successful when the defendant LEA is
undisputedly no longer the district of residence for the
student.32
Furthermore, such motions have been granted when the
parent plaintiffs do not qualify as parents for purposes of the

authority to rule on discrimination claims, tort claims, and constitutional claims); In
re: Student with a Disability, 54 IDELR 240 (Va. SEA, Jan. 23, 2010) (holding the
hearing officer lacked authority to rule on claim under McKinney-Vento Homeless
Assistance Act); Waynesville R-VI Sch. Dist., (Mo SEA, Mar. 2008) (finding the hearing
officer had no authority to rule on school district personnel matters); L.M. v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1999 (finding the hearing officer properly
refused to hear claim related to racial discrimination); In re: Student with a Disability,
111 LRP 50818 (Va. SEA, May 16, 2011) (finding the hearing officer lacked jurisdiction
over state court order related to juvenile proceeding).
29
Los Angeles Cnty. Office of Educ., 111 LRP 21575 (Cal. SEA, Mar. 16, 2011);
Wallingford-Swarthmore Sch. Dist. 110 LRP 40290 (Pa. SEA, Apr. 13, 2010).
30
Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 241 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.N.H. 2003).
31
A.W. v. Marlborough Co. and Portland Healthcare, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.
Conn. 1998).
32
In re: Student with a Disability, 111 LRP 74582 (N.Y. SEA, Aug. 28, 2010);
Fairhaven Pub. Sch & Acushnet Pub. Sch., 110 LRP 43882 (Mass. SEA, Jul. 16, 2010).
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IDEA.33 Oftentimes the parent no longer has standing to act
on the student-child’s behalf once the student-child turns
eighteen.34 Another example of this is a student who graduates
or moves out of the district and who is no longer entitled to a
FAPE from the district.35
D.

Demur

There are also cases where demur has been successfully
used to get a complaint dismissed where the plaintiff has failed
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such an
approach, similar to a Rule 12(b)(6)36 motion in federal court,
presumes the facts in the complaint to be true, and allows for
the dismissal of the complaint if it fails to state claim on that
basis. While this type of approach overlaps, to some extent,
with the concept of a sufficiency challenge, it is primarily used
to address complaints that allege sufficient facts, but fail to
state a viable claim for relief even if those facts are true.37 This
approach of demur has rarely been used in the context of
special education complaints at the administrative level.
However, this approach should be permitted and has been
found to be permissible in at least two decisions.
One such case is the case of T.S. v. Independent School
District No. 54, where the student at issue graduated from high
school and, thus, was no longer entitled to a FAPE.38 The
allegations in the complaint were procedural in nature,
namely, the failure to provide notice of the student’s
graduation or hold an exit meeting.39 The court explained that,
since the only allegations in the complaint were procedural and
no harm was alleged to the student, the parents failed to state

33
See Loch v. Edwardsville Sch. Dist. No. 7, 327 Fed. Appx. 647 (7th Cir. 2009);
Norwalk City Sch. Dist., 111 LRP 50530 (Ohio SEA, Jun. 17, 2011); In re: Student with
a Disability, 111 LRP 50818; Lincoln Sudbury Pub. Sch., 110 LRP 73205 (Mass. SEA,
Nov. 29, 2010).
34
See Loch, 327 Fed. Appx. 647; Norwalk City Sch. Dist., 111 LRP 50530; In re:
Student with a Disability, 111 LRP 50818; Lincoln Sudbury Pub. Sch., 110 LRP 73205.
35
T.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 54, 265 F.3d 1090, 1092 (10th Cir. 2001); Smith
v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 184 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 1999).
36
Fed R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
37
See T.S., 265 F.3d at 1090; Interboro Sch. Dist., 109 LRP 56717 (Pa. SEA,
Jun. 9, 2009).
38 T.S., 265 F.3d at 1092.
39
Id. at 1093.
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a claim upon which relief could be granted.40 The reviewing
federal court found that the hearing officer acted properly in
rejecting the request for a due process hearing.41
Another example of this approach is found in Interboro
School District42, where a parent sought to amend the
complaint to add allegations of student-on-student harassment
under Section 504.43 Following an opportunity for a resolution
session on the new claim, the school district filed a motion to
dismiss. The district stated that even if the alleged facts in the
amended complaint and as explained at the resolution session
were true, the parents failed to state a valid claim for studenton-student harassment.44 The hearing officer agreed and
dismissed the amended complaint without a hearing.45
E.

Undue Delay

There are several cases in which hearing officers have
dismissed due process hearing requests because the parents
have failed to timely pursue the hearing request or have
repeatedly delayed the process.46 In many of these cases, the
hearing officer considers the efforts made and the lack of
response from the parent.47 The parents are typically advised
that they must take some action in order to move the hearing
process forward, including exchanging documents with
opposing counsel or appearing at a hearing, but then fail to do
so.48 Hearing officers who have dismissed a complaint on this
basis typically do so on the basis that the IDEA anticipates a
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1096.
42
Interboro Sch. Dist., 109 LRP 56717.
43
Id. at n. 1. It is noted that in Pennsylvania Section 504 claims can be heard
by hearing officers who also hear IDEA claims. See 22 PA. CODE § 15.8(d) (1991).
44
Interboro Sch. Dist., 109 LRP 56717.
45
Id.
46
See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., State of Wis. Div. of Hearings and Appeals
No. LEA-00-016 (Wis. SEA, 2000); Philbin v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, No. 09cv-30101-FDS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27699 (D. Mass. Jan. 6, 2010); Albuquerque Pub.
Sch., N.M. Pub. Educ. Dept. No. DPH 0809-28 (N.H. SEA, Aug. 2009); Taunton Pub.
Sch., 111 LRP 18231 (Mass. SEA, Mar. 8, 2011); In re: Student with a Disability, 55
IDELR 89 (Va. SEA, Jun. 3, 2010); Distrist of Columbia, 111 LRP 18430 (DC SEA, Feb.
2, 2010).
47
See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., State of Wis. Div. of Hearings and Appeals
No. LEA-00-016 (Wis. SEA, 2000); In re: Student with a Disability, 55 IDELR 89.
48
Albuquerque Pub. Sch., N.M. Public Education Dept. No. DPH 0809-28 (N.H.
SEA, Aug. 2009); Taunton Pub. Schs., 111 LRP 18231; In re: Student with a Disability,
55 IDELR 89; District of Columbia, 111 LRP 18430.
40
41
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process that will lead to swift resolution of matters.49
Accordingly, motions can be an effective way to dispose of cases
in which parents fail to prosecute their case.
F.

Mootness

Finally, there are several cases that have been dismissed
without a hearing where the claims asserted in the complaint
have become moot. Dismissal in such instances is typically due
to the passage of time or an uncontested change in facts. One
common example is where a parent makes a demand in the
complaint and the district has unquestionably agreed to the
demand.50 Another common example is where the only relief
sought is a change to the current IEP or program. Therefore,
when the student graduates from high school, the request is
While admittedly dismissal for mootness is less
moot.51
common because most parties will usually voluntarily
withdraw under such circumstances, these cases demonstrate
that school districts have the ability to seek dismissal of the
complaint when an issue become moot, if the parents will not
withdraw the complaint voluntarily.
There are a number of cases in which hearing officers have
approved the use of pre-hearing motions to dispose of cases
under the IDEA. It is submitted that such an approach is
permissible under the IDEA and its use should be expanded,
especially in the uncommon approach of seeking a demur to the
complaint.
IV. CASES IN WHICH DISMISSAL HAS BEEN FOUND
INAPPROPRIATE HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO THE FACTS OF THE
SPECIFIC CASE – NOT ON THE BASIS OF A BROADER FINDING
THAT SUCH AN APPROACH IS PER SE IMPERMISSIBLE UNDER THE
IDEA.
Several courts and hearing officers have noted concerns
about the approach of dismissing cases prior to holding a
hearing, especially in light of the IDEA’s explicit command that

49
See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., State of Wis. Div. of Hearings and Appeals
No. LEA-00-016 (Wis. SEA, 2000).
50
Worcester Cnty. Pub. Sch., 111 LRP 57189 (Md. SEA, July 7, 2010); Los
Angeles Cnty. Office of Educ., 111 LRP 21575.
51
Stamford Bd. of Educ., 111 LRP 5946 (Conn. SEA, Sept. 23, 2010).
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such hearings should be held.52 They did not, however, address
the permissibility of prehearing dismissals of claims in a
general sense. In other words, there is no case law that rejects
the idea that of prehearing dismissals wholesale; rather, such
decisions found dismissal improper because of the specific facts
and circumstances at issue.
“When [a due process] complaint is filed, the IDEA
unambiguously states that, ‘the parents involved in such a
complaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due
process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State
educational agency.”53 Therefore, the IDEA would appear to
provide a right for a hearing.54 Several courts have expressed
grave concerns about practices and procedures, including
prehearing dismissal of complaints, which block the ability of
the parents to obtain a hearing, although no court has said
such an approach violates the IDEA.55 When opposing an effort
to dismiss a case without a hearing, it is often argued, pointing
to the cases that express this concern, that such an approach is
impermissible under the IDEA. However, a closer view of the
cases where dismissal has been found improper reveals that
such findings are predicated upon the fact-intensive
circumstances of the case and not a general finding that due
process hearings must be held in all cases. Accordingly,
several courts have reversed findings that have dismissed cases
without a hearing because the substantive reasons for
dismissal were improper. Notably, the courts remained silent
on the broader question of whether the hearing officer was
required to have a hearing if the substantive findings of the
hearing officer had been correct.56 For example, in Cocores v.
Portsmouth New Hampshire School District,57 the court
determined that the hearing officer improperly found that a
52
See Zirkel, supra, note 7; Hazelton Area Sch. Dist., 102 LRP 1948 (Pa. SEA,
Aug. 23, 2001).
53
Alexander R. v. Brookline Sch. Dist., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83481, at *7
(emphasis added) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(1)).
54
Id.; see also Patsel v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 522 F. Supp. 535 (D.D.C. 1981);
Philbin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27699; Hunt v. Bartman, 873 F. Supp. 229 (W.D. Mo.
1994); Hazelton Area Sch. Dist., 102 LRP 1948.
55
Id.
56
See Cocores v. Portsmouth, N.H., Sch. Dist., 779 F. Supp. 203 (D.N.H. 1991)
(finding the hearing officer improperly dismissed claim of student who was over
twenty-one for claims she was denied a FAPE before she reached age twenty-one based
upon the substantive law, but not upon the basis that a hearing was required).
57
Id.
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student over the age of twenty-one did not have standing to
bring claims related to the student’s education prior to age
twenty-one without a hearing. Importantly, the court did not
address the issue of whether it is improper to consider such a
question without holding a hearing.58
Another example is a series of cases, prior to the
amendment of the IDEA, in which hearings officers found they
did not have the legal authority to award tuition
reimbursement and thus denied the request for a hearing.
However, a number of courts found that parents could request
tuition reimbursement under the IDEA and found such claims
should be heard by hearing officers.59 In other cases, the issues
raised in the complaint related to alleged non-compliance with
a settlement agreement; the hearing officer ultimately found
that it is not in his or her jurisdiction to hear such a claim.60
Whether a hearing officer has the authority to enforce a
settlement agreement is, as of yet, an issue not fully decided by
the courts.61 In several cases, courts have found that the
hearing officer was incorrect in determining that he or she did
not have the jurisdiction to hear such claims therefore
dismissal was improper.62
Finally, a number of other cases have found the prehearing
dismissal of a complaint improper because the hearing officer
based his decision to dismiss on improper legal grounds. In
Lyons v. Lower Merion School District,63 the hearing officer
dismissed the complaint on the basis that she lacked authority
to award an Independent Educational Evaluation at public
expense and could not enforce a resolution agreement.64
However, the court found that the hearing officer made a legal
error in her analysis and did in fact have the authority to

Id.
See, e.g., S-1 v. Spangler, 832 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 1987).
60
Lyons v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 09-5576, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
142268, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010); I.K. v. School Dist. of Haverford Twp., No. 104397, 2011 WL 1042311 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2011); Steward v. Hillsboro Sch. Dist. No. 1,
No. CV 00-835-AS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9887, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 1, 2001).
61
Lyons, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 142268, at *8; I.K., 2011 WL 1042311; see also note
27 above and accompanying text discussing cases where it has been found that hearing
officers lack jurisdiction to hear such claims.
62
Lyons, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 142268; I.K., 2011 WL 1042311; Steward, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9887, at *11–*12.
63
Lyons, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142268.
64
Id. at *3.
58
59
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address both issues.65
In Philbin v. Bureau of Special
Education Appeals,66 the reviewing court found the dismissal of
parents’ due process complaint for want of prosecution to be
improper. The court reached this conclusion because the
hearing officer acted improperly in his application of rules
related to scheduling created by the state.67 In Patsel v. District
of Columbia Board. of Education68 and Hunt v. Bartman,69
hearing officers in both cases dismissed complaints as not yet
ripe, noting that the school district had not finalized the
placement decision for the student.70 However, in both cases,
the reviewing court found that the hearing officer’s findings
were based upon incorrect findings of fact.71
In sum, while a number of cases have found that
prehearing dismissals of due process complaints were
improper, the results of those cases were based upon a legal or
factual error of the hearing officer. It was these errors that
forced the conclusion of improper dismissal, not that the IDEA
mandates a hearing in all cases. To the contrary, there is
abundance of case law in which a prehearing dismissal was
found to be proper. Moreover, the need for judicial economy
undercuts any suggestion that a hearing must be held in every
case. This is true even in cases where a hearing officer does not
have jurisdiction or the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient
to support the claim. While there exist cases in which a hearing
was found to be necessary, such findings appear to be limited to
the specific facts of those cases rather than some broader rule.
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: USE OF PRE-HEARING
DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER THE IDEA SHOULD BE EXPANDED
Unless state rules provide otherwise, there appears to be a
lot of room for creativity in filing of prehearing motions to
dismiss due process complaints in some circumstances. The
65
Id. at *7–*11. It is important to note that the court did directly address the
issue of the ability of the hearing officer to rule on the resolution agreement, but rather
found the parents did not really ask the hearing officer to enforce the same and instead
were seeking due process to obtain an IEE at public expense.
66
Philbin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27699.
67
Id. at *17.
68
Patsel., 522 F. Supp. 535.
69
Hunt, 873 F. Supp. 229.
70
Hunt, 873 F. Supp. at 238; see also Patsel, 522 F. Supp. at 539.
71
Hunt, 873 F. Supp. at 243; see also Patsel, 522 F. Supp. at 539–40.
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ability to file such motions depends largely on what the filing
party alleges in the complaint, which suggests a need for
careful pleading by the filing party. While the IDEA appears to
require a hearing, it is clear that under some circumstances it
may be possible to avoid one by filing an appropriate motion
early in the case. In certain cases, such motions may avoid the
expense and effort required by a full hearing or, at the very
least, narrowing the issues for the hearing. Prehearing motions
could also serve to cut down the length of the hearing, saving
time and money.
It is important to note that the number of hearings that
hearing officers are being asked to handle is increasing,
suggesting a need for a more efficient means of resolving these
matters.72 An increase in the use of the aforementioned
procedures of dismissal would be an effective and appropriate
means to reduce the number of cases going to hearing early in
the process. One approach would be for parties to be more
proactive about motions practice in this area of the law, or for
states that do not already have such a procedure in place to
provide a procedure for dispositive motions through the
regulations related to special education due process hearings.
Accordingly, the use of pre-hearing motions is permissible
under the IDEA and their use should be increased.

72
See, e.g., 2010 IDEA PART B INDICATOR ANALYSIS at 171 (Aug. 2010); Special
Education Today (Dec. 17, 2010).

